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ARGUMENT 
I. THIS COURT SHOD LD COIN SIDES f"« I l l ' i \ INWAR11 : I 
CONSTITUTIONAL ARGUMENTS 
: I MR. WINWARD'S CONSTITUTIONAI iRGl JMEN1 S WERE 
PRESERVED UNDER THE "EGREGIOUS INJUSTICE" EXCEPTION 
I he State argues that I"\ 1 t W iiiv. at: d 's Constitutional arguments w ere notpreserv ed 
a i l ( | should therefore not even be considered hv the eoinl < Mi llie <"f!iei IKIIHI, Ihe Mile 
argues that ", - *; ihi- :~Vuri . <>uld applv l iv egregious injustice" exception" 
(Appellee 's Brief t r a g e 1?) This same ! u ^ w ••.,.*• .ipplv tc M - Winward ' s 
Constitutional a rg - :• 
procedure" (Appel lee 's Brief at »^"e 13) This is the 'v^pci venue to address 
Constitutional issues and that is what Mr. Winward is attempting to do with this appeal to 
i;pi«N > . i . , - i M.. .in i.cti issues were p r e s e n r u muki -.11 .iinhii oi 
;^r . 'jrceio- - si i iv" ,*\. . * e. ., ,- • -
be brought before the Supreme Court, but when it 15 b iv .ugiH DCio-iO the Supreme Court 
that it is now too late and must have been brought before the Trial Court. 
Ill • T H E P C R A ' S S T A T U T E O F L I M I T A T I O N S IS UNC < HNS I ' l l I I IK I P 
AND PRESENTS AN "EGREGIOUS INJUSTICE" 
Again, the State approaches this argument as a new issue and thus analyzes it as if 
it was not preserved. As stated bUoic, nowever,, this argument is actually a reason 
behind why 11 it - "egregious ni|us1ieen eMvplimi applte in ilih i.bt" i In IIIIIV\ ,IM , 
arguments are based upon the "egregious injustice" exception spelled out in Gardner v. 
State, 2010 UT 46, % 91, 234 P.3d 1115. I lie Consliiiiliwnal issues are sub;,,, o\ \ s 
1 
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"egregious exception" rather than new, separate arguments raised for the first time on 
appeal Thus, these arguments were preserved because they are part and parcel of the 4 
"egregious injustice" exception as provided under Gardner. They further flesh out and 
demonstrate the "egregious injustice" argument rather than create a new argument 
i 
altogether. 
The State argues that Mr. Winward's case citations were distinguished by this 
Court ". . .on the basis that they 'were decided upon prior to recent amendments to the { 
PCRA and to the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure relating to the PCRA.'" (Appellee's 
Brief at page 17) However, since the new rules went into effect in 2010, there have not 
been many cases taken up to challenge the Constitutionality of the new PCRA rules, so 
these prior cases Eire still helpful in that regard. 
Thus, the case law is primarily from the pre-2010 rules. Furthermore, the case law 
has not been overturned, although the Court did note that these cases were decided prior 
to the new rules. Thus, this case is one of the first to use the "egregious injustice" 
exception spelled out by the Utah Supreme Court (which incidentally, was not included 
in the PCRA rules—the Utah Supreme Court had the obligation to set forth this exception 
pursuant to its powers). 
Additionally, the State argues in its Brief that the "interests of justice" and "good 
cause" exceptions are inapplicable since, it argues, the District Court did not plainly err 
and that no exceptional circumstances exist. As stated above, this analysis is assuming 
that these are new arguments on appeal. However, again, these arguments are subsets of 
2 
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the "egregious injustice" argument and go to show how an "egregious injustice" occurred 
in Mr. Winward's case. It is not necessary to show that there was plain error or 
exceptional circumstances because these arguments were preserved, as examples of the 
egregious injustice that occurred in Mr. Winward's case. 
Furthermore, these exceptions should be used as barometers in gauging whether a 
case fits within the "egregious injustice exception since this Court has not yet defined 
"egregious injustice." 
II. THIS COURT SHOULD ALLOW AN EXCEPTION TO THE PCRA'S 
TIME BAR: Enforcement of the PCRA'S Time Bar in This Case, 
Including the Tolling Provision, Would Result in an Egregious Injustice 
Mr. Winward received ineffective assistance of counsel at both the trial and 
appellate levels. Mr. Winward was unfamiliar with the legal system and lacked the 
resources in the state prison to further his case. Furthermore, since Mr. Winward had 
been represented by the same attorney for both his trial case and for his appeal, he 
believed his remedies were exhausted and did not have the requisite legal knowledge 
necessary to further his case. 
Although the State cites to Carper v. DeLand, 54 F.3d 613 (19th Cir. 1995) for the 
proposition that Utah's prison contract attorneys ". . .arrangement exceed the 
constitutional requirements necessary to ensure that inmates receive access to the courts" 
(page 24), that does not show that this was the case with Mr. Winward. Furthermore, as 
Justice Zimmerman's concurring opinion in Julian v. State demonstrated, "the legal 
services provided to assist the prisoners are grossly inadequate." (966 P.2d 249, 259 
3 
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(Utah 1998)). The Julian case was decided three years after the Carper case. Justice 
Zimmerman's opinion is in line with what Mr. Winward faced as a prisoner and it was 
only much later when he did have enough funds to retain an attorney that he was able to 
uncover the current claims. 
III. DISMISSING MR. WINWARD'S PETITION WOULD AMOUNT TO AN 
EGREGIOUS INJUSTICE 
A. Mr. Winward Had "Good Cause'5 for His Petition and Allowing His 
Petition to Move Forward is in the "Interests of Justice55 
The State argues in its brief that the Court should not use these old standards and 
in any event that it believes Mr. Winward has not met these standards anyway. However, 
even the State acknowledges that the "egregious injustice" exception remains undefined. 
The old standards are a good place to look in defining the "egregious injustice" exception 
and that is why Mr. Winward has looked to those standards. Furthermore, Mr. Winward 
can satisfy the requirements of these old standards, as seen below. 
In the first part of the analysis, Mr. Winward must show that his Petition is in "the 
interests of justice," with the Court considering the potential merits of his claims and the 
reasons for the delay in filing. See Adams v. State, 2005 UT 62, \ 16, 123 P.3d 400. Mr. 
Winward can also meet the "good cause" exception by showing that his claims were ". . 
.overlooked in good faith with no intent to delay or abuse the writ." Br. Applt at 23 
(quoting Hurst, 111 P.2d at 1037). 
The State argues that Mr. Winward's false sense that his options were foreclosed was 
an ". . .unreasonable reading of the court of appeals' opinion (Appellee's Brief at page 
4 
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28). Importantly, however, the State's opinion of what is a reasonable interpretation is 
based upon the State's appellate attorneys' analysis of the case law. Mr. Winward does 
not have the education, background, nor experience, nor anything even close to the 
State's appellate attorneys. Indeed, it can be presumed most attorneys in the State of 
Utah do not have this type of experience. 
It is unreasonable for the State to confer its own definition of "reasonableness" to 
Mr. Winward. What is more reasonable is that Mr. Winward was relying on his attorney 
to know the law and to represent him in his case, and it was reasonable for Mr. Winward 
to rely on his attorney to do so. Mr. Winward also relied on his attorney's interpretation 
of the opinion from the Court of Appeals and his attorney was ineffective for failing to 
explain to Mr. Winward his options beyond that point. The interpretation of case law is 
what Mr. Winward's attorney was hired to do, not to pass it on to Mr. Winward and 
assume that he understood everything, including possible appeals and further ineffective 
assistance of counsel arguments. 
The State further argues that the Court of Appeals rejected Mr. Winward's 
ineffective assistance claim ". . .because it did not claim prejudice". (Appellee's Brief at 
page 28, quoting State v. Winward, 941 P.2d 627, 635 (1997)). However, Mr. Winward's 
trial and appellate counsel, Edward Brass' ("Brass") continued representation is the 
problem with that analysis. 
However, Brass's representation of his own ineffective assistance of counsel for 
Mr. Winward in the unenviable and dubious position of arguing for his own ineffective 
5 
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assistance of counsel, i.e., that he made some big mistakes, or on the other hand, arguing 
slightly for the cause and getting a published opinion that he did no wrong. Brass's < 
allegiances were split, ostensibly arguing for his client that he, Brass, was ineffective 
while not pushing too hard because of malpractice considerations. That, in the best of 
circumstances, is an obvious conflict of interest. Thus, this opinion from the Court of 
Appeals is marred by the continued representation of Brass, and once Brass received the 
opinion, he had no motivation to further his client's interests by explaining his further 
options or that he should not have represented him in the appeal. 
In sum, Mr. Winward relied, in good faith, on his advocate and attorney, Brass, 
to guide him through the legal process, including his appeals. Although all of his 
avenues may not have been actually exhausted at that time, Mr. Winward, the 
unsophisticated prison inmate, believed they were and his attorney failed to advise him of 
his options or to pursue all of his remedies. Mr. Winward has met the exceptions to the 
PCRA procedural bar under the "interests of justice" "good cause" and "egregious 
injustice" exception. His claims are meritorious. This will be demonstrated below. 
1. Mr. Winward's Claims are Meritorious 
This Court must decide if Mr. Winward's claims are "potentially meritorious" to 
justify an exception to the procedural time bar as contained in the PCRA. Adams, 2005 
UT 62, ffl[ 23, 26. Mr. Winward has meritorious claims of several instances of ineffective 
assistance of counsel, as follows: 
6 
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a. Mr. Winward's trial counsel was ineffective for not presenting 
evidence that T.W. initially denied the allegations for three months 
Mr. Winward initially argued that attorney Brass was ineffective for his failing to 
present evidence that T.W. initially denied the allegations for three months (Br. Aplt. at 
25-27). The State argues that "although the evidence may have supported this argument, 
Winward cites no authority holding that an attorney must argue every reasonable 
inference from the evidence." (Appellee's Brief at page 32). The State further argues 
that "The precise period during which T.W. denied was immaterial." (Appellee's Brief at 
page 33). The State's arguments misconstrue Mr. Winward's arguments. 
Mr. Winward never argued that Brass was ineffective for failing to "argue every 
reasonable inference from the evidence." Rather, Mr. Winward was arguing a specific 
point; i.e., that Brass was ineffective for failing to present evidence that T.W. initially 
denied the allegations for three months. This goes beyond merely being an inference 
from the evidence but rather a critical point in the evidence that should have been 
emphasized to the jury. Failing to note this time was not "immaterial" but rather was 
crucial in showing that T.W.'s credibility was suspect. 
In a rape case, credibility is of the utmost importance and failing to bring this 
matter before the jury severely hampered Mr. Winward's defense and prejudiced him 
from presenting his defense. The three month time frame is critical in that T.W.'s 
credibility should have been impeached, which would have also led to the specter of 
others coaching this witness, which could then have also been used against the other 
witnesses as well. This prejudice led directly to Mr. Winward's conviction, resulting in 
7 
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an egregious injustice. 
b. Mr. Winward's trial counsel was ineffective in keeping Douglas 
Bills, a biased juror, on the jury 
The State argues here that Brass cannot be shown to have been ineffective in 
keeping Douglas Bills ("Bills") on the jury in Mr. Winward's case. The State argues first 
that "Brass was evidently satisfied with Bills' assurance that he would be impartial." 
However, this choice to keep Bills on the jury was not plausibly justifiable, given his 
deep-seated biases and distraction with his master's thesis defense. Bills' law-
enforcement oriented attitude and the fact that he had a sister who had been a victim of 
sex abuse, combined with the preceding, leave little doubt that he should have been 
excluded from the jury. The real question is would you want this person on YOUR jury 
if you were a suspect, and the answer is a simple resounding NO. This prejudiced Mr. 
Winward and resulted in his conviction, which under these circumstances is an egregious 
injustice. 
The State also argues that "the record contradicts Winward's claims that Bills was 
distracted by his master's thesis defense." (Appellee's Brief at page 37). The record 
actually demonstrates that the master's thesis defense was a distraction to Bills. In fact, it 
was on Bills' mind enough that he mentioned it on the record. Further, he was concerned 
about it enough that he stated: "I've got questions in my mind, are we going to get it done 
by Thursday? There's a panic feeling in my mind too. I'll be saying let's hurry up and 
get this thing done because I have to go somewhere." C.R. 474. 
The State points out that the verdict was reached on May 31, but that was just in 
8 
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time for Bills to get to his thesis defense, which happened to be the next day. It's no 
surprise or leap of logic that Bills was in a rush to get to his master's defense on time and 
this resulted in an early conviction. Bills even mentioned it was an issue, but once he 
was on the jury, he was able to assist in getting the verdict done early enough so it would 
no longer be a worry. Not surprisingly, the jury reached a guilty verdict on Wednesday, 
May 31, at 4:45 pm, less than 24 hours before Mr. Bills had to leave to defense his 
master's thesis. Bills should have been dismissed by Brass and failing to dismiss this 
jury resulted in an egregious injustice in Mr. Winward's convictions. 
c. Mr. Winward's trial counsel was ineffective for not calling 
witnesses from the first trial at his second trial 
The State argues next that Brass was not ineffective for not calling the scoutmaster 
and the teacher in the second trial (whom he had called in the first trial). The hung jury 
in the first trial (in which these witnesses did testify) proves otherwise. 
The State argues first that the scoutmaster was unnecessary in so much that R.W. 
provided the same testimony as the scoutmaster (Appellee's Brief at page 39-40). That 
argument is flawed for many reasons. 
First, Brass should have called the scoutmaster who would have testified not only 
as to the "good touch/bad touch" during the time of the alleged abuse, but also that the 
alleged victims never approached him with any concerns. In this type of case, where 
credibility is of the utmost concern, this evidence was critical to Mr. Winward's defense 
in showing another, independent witness, who never noticed nor heard of any bad 
touching despite interacting with the alleged victim every single week and having the 
9 
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relationship as a trusted scoutmaster. 
Second, having the evidence go through R.W. only helped the jury to identify with { 
R.W. more rather than having the evidence come through an independent, unbiased third 
party. Apparently, according to the State, Brass could have used R.W. as his only 
i 
witness and covered all of his bases. By doing this, Brass was ineffective as counsel for 
Mr. Winward and this ineffectiveness directly resulted in prejudice to Mr. Winward, as 
evidenced by his conviction on his second trial compared to the hung jury on his first trial 
(where these witnesses did testify). 
Similarly, Brass should have called T.W.'s teacher to testify at the second trial, 
just as he did in the first trial. Just as the scoutmaster was a trusted adult, the teacher was 
an independent, unbiased witness who could testify of her observations of T.W., but this 
time on a daily basis for the majority of the school day. Her live testimony, especially 
combined with the scoutmaster's testimony, would have gone directly against the alleged 
victim's testimonies. Unfortunately for Mr. Winward, in the second trial only the alleged 
victims testified rather than these two witnesses. 
The State argues that ". . .even if the teacher's live testimony would have 
convinced the jury to completely disbelieve T.W., the jury still could have convicted 
Winward as charged based on R.W.'s and A.F.'s testimony." (Appellee's Brief at page 
40). This argument fails. Of course the jury could have convicted Winward based upon 
any evidence. The jury could have done whatever it wanted to in regards to its verdict. 
However, the evidence shows that when this testimony was properly introduced, as in the 
10 
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first trial, the jury affirmatively chose not to convict, instead resulting in a hung trial. 
Rather than speculating as to what the jury "could have done" the Court can look at what 
the jury did do when this evidence was actually presented, as it was in the first trial. 
d. Mr. Winward's trial counsel was ineffective for failing to 
adequately explain the State's plea offer 
The State argues that Mr. Winward's claims of ineffective assistance of counsel 
during the plea bargain stage fails under State v. Greuber, 2007 UT 50 <[[11, 165 P.3d 
1185, ". . .where this Court held that a fair trial negates any possible prejudice arising 
from deficient representation during the plea bargaining process." (Appellee's Brief at 
page 41). The State argues alternatively that the Greuber rule should not be overturned 
because it was unpreserved, and even under the Greuber rule, that Mr. Winward did not 
have an unfair trial. The evidence points otherwise. 
First, as to the State's claims that the arguments were unpreserved, these 
arguments are also enveloped under the "egregious exception" ambit. In other words, 
these arguments were preserved because they demonstrate why this case is an "egregious 
exception" and this is one of the reasons. 
Second, the Greuber rule should be overturned and this Court should recognize 
the opposite holding, as is the case with many other jurisdictions. The plea stage is 
independent of the trial stage and could have resolved the case prior to trial (which occurs 
in the vast majority of cases), to the satisfaction of all parties. The Defendant should 
have effective counsel at this stage of the proceedings to ensure that his case is advocated 
to its fullest by counsel. By failing to overturn the Greuber rule, the Court would be 
11 
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denying the Defendant effective counsel at this stage in his case, potentially resulting in 
convictions of much more serious offenses, as has occurred in this case. < 
Third, should the Court continue the Greuber rale, Mr. Winward has shown that 
he did not have a fair trial, for all the reasons enumerated previously. These instances of 
ineffective assistance of counsel resulted in an unfair trial for Mr. Winward. Each 
instance as described herein and in Appellant's Brief, resulted in Mr. Winward's 
conviction, based upon the unfair trial. Mr. Winward did have a fair trial in his first trial, ' 
which resulted in a hung jury but in the second trial (when Brass failed to communicate 
the plea bargain) had numerous instances of ineffective assistance of counsel and that 
resulted in Mr. Winward5s unfair trial. Thus, even under the current Greuber rule, his 
conviction should be reversed and remanded for a new trial based on this egregious 
injustice. 
e. Mr. Winward's trial counsel was ineffective for not meeting with 
him before the second trial 
The State argues that regardless of the amount of time spent with Mr. Winward, 
Brass was not ineffective in this aspect, especially since he had already had one trial with 
Mr. Winward (Appellee's Brief at pages 42-43). The State points to Nicholls v. State, 
2009 UT 12 P 8 , 203 P.3d 976 for the notion that this Court has "refused to hold that 
counsel is ineffective based on the amount of time counsel spent working on the case or 
consulting with a client." 
However, in this case, Brass failed to meet with Mr. Winward even once prior to 
his second trial. Certainly the Court would recognize that there is a difference between 
12 
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spending adequate time and spending no time meeting with a defendant, which is what 
took place. This goes beyond just time spent "consulting with a client" but also to 
preparation and the defendant having knowledge of what is occurring and what to expect. 
In this case, Mr. Winward suffered prejudice. Mr. Winward took the witness 
stand without any preparation of what to expect this time around and Brass should have 
met with Mr. Winward to prepare Mr. Winward for his testimony. Furthermore, Brass 
should have met with Mr. Winward to analyze whether to even have Mr. Winward testify 
or not. Instead, Mr. Winward went in blindly to trial, not having met with his attorney at 
all and relying on him to present his defense, despite never having even met prior to the 
second trial. There was zero preparation time for Mr. Winward to anticipate hostile 
questions or even to prepare answers for his own attorney's questions. This resulted in 
prejudice to Mr. Winward and made the second trial an egregious injustice. 
f. Mr. Winward's trial counsel was ineffective for not calling T.W.'s 
caseworker, a forensic child psychologist, or a medical expert as 
witnesses 
The State argues in this instance that Mr. Winward cannot demonstrate ineffective 
assistance of counsel by his attorney failing to call these witnesses (Appellee's Brief at 
page 47). However, as noted in Appellant's Brief, the Housekeeper and Lenkhart cases 
demonstrate otherwise {State v. Housekeeper, 2008 UT 78. State v. Lenkhart 2011 UT 
27.) . These two cases have already been briefed in Appellant's Brief, but the State does 
not address either of them. Mr. Winward submits on these cases and how Mr. Winward's 
case is substantially similar to the facts of these cases. By failing to address these two 
13 
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cases, Mr. Winward is left to conclude that the State agrees with his arguments. 
The State further argues that these proposed witnesses are merely speculative and 
unspecified testimony (Appellee's Brief at page 46). However, in Appellant's Brief, Mr. 
Winward spelled out each witness and what he or she would have brought to the table 
had he or she actually been called to testify as a witness. A summary is provided of each 
witness, as follows: 
T.W.'s Caseworker: This witness was an independent third party witness, who 
could have been used to impeach the alleged victims in this case, just as the scoutmaster 
and teacher could have been utilized as well. In a credibility case such as this, the more 
witnesses who can refute the alleged victim's testimonies, particularly in different 
aspects, the more problems with the credibility of the alleged victims. As mentioned in 
Appellate's Brief, T.W. was interviewed by this caseworker, who also recorded the 
interviews. These taped interviewed should have been introduced through Brass to show 
more inconsistent statements and further demonstrate the possibility of coaching, which 
could also be extrapolated to the other witnesses. By failing to call this witness, Mr. 
Winward was prejudiced by an unfair trial resulting in an egregious injustice. 
Forensic Child Psychologist: Appellant's Brief already described this witness 
succinctly, as follows: "A defense expert could have turned the trial alone, especially in 
conjunction with the lack of physical evidence, to offer a plausible explanation as to why 
children in this age bracket would potentially testify the way they did, absent the actual 
occurrence of the alleged events, and to further explore the critical issue of coaching." 
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(Appellee's Brief at page 41). Although the State argues that "acceptable representation 
under Strickland 'entitle[s] counsel to 'balance limited resources in accord with effective 
trial tactics and strategies.'" (Appellee's Brief at page 46, quoting from Harrington v. 
Richter, 131 S. Ct. 770, 789 (2011)), Rule 15 of the Utah Rules of Criminal Procedures 
would have been available to compensate for the expert witness fees, so the balancing of 
limited financial resources should not have been a consideration. 
Medical Expert: Here, the State argues that "cross-examination of the 
State's expert will often suffice." (Appellee's Brief at page 47, quoting from Id. at 791). 
However, "often suffice" does not cut it when, as in this case, the medical expert's 
testimony was a necessity to Mr. Winward's defense. Plainly put, cross-examining the 
State's expert did not suffice and Mr. Winward has now suffered an egregious injustice 
by being convicted. As mentioned above, in this type of credibility contest, Brass was 
ineffective for failing to produce an expert witness to impeach the alleged victims' 
testimony with an expert opinion, one that would carry even more sway than the other, 
fact-based independent third party witnesses. With the inconsistencies in the victims' 
testimony more thoroughly examined and with an expert to provide his medically-based 
opinion, this likely would have resulted in an acquittal for Mr. Winward. 
Therefore, the failures by Mr. Winward's trial attorney to provide as witnesses 
T.W.'s caseworker, a forensic psychologist, and an expert medical witness, is clearly 
ineffective counsel and promoted an egregious injustice against Mr. Winward's trial, 
resulting in his ultimate conviction. 
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< 
g. Mr. Winward's trial counsel was ineffective for raising his own 
ineffectiveness on appeal 
i 
The State argues here that "the Utah Court of Appeals rejected the ineffectiveness 
claim55 (Appellee's Brief at page 47). The State also argues that Mr. Winward suffered 
no prejudice. Again, the evidence says otherwise. { 
The State relies in its argument that the Utah Court of Appeals has already decided 
the ineffectiveness claim and found there to be none. This argument is unpersuasive, 
however, because Brass handled that very case. As mentioned previously, Brass had 
little motivation to point out his own deficiencies, and in fact, had every motivation to 
prove that he was effective, so as to protect his own interests. Of course, this is contrary 
to protecting Mr. Winward's interests. This is an inherent conflict of interest which 
tainted the proceedings in the Court of Appeals. Furthermore, by raising the issue 
himself, Brass has already admitted he was ineffective as counsel, at least on the 
particular issues he brought before the Court of Appeals. 
The State also argues that Mr. Winward "fails to identify any specific argument or 
evidence that a different attorney could have raised that would have produced a different 
result." (Appellee's Brief at page 48). The petition in this case addresses those claims 
already. Remarkably, Brass failed to bring up any of these claims in his appeal, only 
arguing that he should have objected during the State's closing arguments. The 
remaining arguments for ineffective assistance of counsel are contained in the petition in 
this case and have been briefed extensively. These claims show that a different result 
would have likely ensued and because Mr. Winward was convicted with these trial 
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deficiencies, he suffered prejudice and an egregious injustice occurred in his case. 
h. Mr. Winward has shown cumulative error 
The State argues that Mr. Winward has not shown any meritorious claims and 
therefore the cumulative error doctrine fails. On the contrary, Mr. Winward has 
demonstrated each error and how each one prejudiced him. Each claim itself was enough 
to show that he was prejudiced and had an unfair trial. This is buttressed by his first trial, 
without most of these errors, resulting in a hung jury. Thus, these cumulative errors have 
resulted in an egregious injustice and Mr. Winward's convictions should therefore be 
reversed and remanded for a new trial. 
DATED this J_ day of March, 2012. 
Respectfully Submitted by: 
M^) 
Matthew G. Morrison 
Attorney for Appellant 
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